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Avaliação da Directiva EU ETS.

A "Comissão Europeia" é "melhor regulamentação" A agenda exige que novas propostas legislativas sejam acompanhadas de uma avaliação da legislação relevante já existente. Este estudo, por conseguinte, avalia a Directiva de Comércio de Emissões da UE à luz de alterações potenciais no pacote global de clima e energia da Europa 2030. O relatório utiliza uma abordagem sistemática para avaliar a relevância, eficácia, eficiência, coerência e valor acrescentado da UE de a Directiva EU ETS. O estudo está disponível para download.

Fallmann, Hubert et al. 2018: Avaliação da Directiva EU ETS. Apoio à revisão do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE., Viena.

Sjors van Iersel.

1. SUMÁRIO EXECUTIVO.

1.1 Sobre este relatório.

1.2 Design do ETS da UE.

1.3 Resultados da avaliação.

1.3.1 ETS da UE em geral.

1.3.2 Configuração do cap.

1.3.4 Alocação gratuita e vazamento de carbono.

1.3.5 Suporte para custos indiretos de CO2.

1.3.6 O sistema de conformidade (monitoramento, relatórios, verificação, credenciamento)

1.3.7 Sistema de registro.

1.3.8 O financiamento NER 300.

1.3.9 Alocação transitória gratuita para a modernização do setor de energia.

1.3.10 ETS e pequenos operadores.

1.3.11 Impacto do RCLE-UE nos agregados familiares.

2.1 O RCLE da UE e a sua história legislativa.

2.2 Metodologia de avaliação.

2.2.1 Lógica de intervenção.

2.2.2 Critérios de avaliação.

2.2.3 Áreas de avaliação.

2.2.4 Fontes de informação e limitações.

3 RESULTADOS DE AVALIAÇÃO.

3.1 EU ETS em geral.

3.1.2 Lógica de intervenção da Directiva EU ETS como um todo.

3.1.6 Valor acrescentado da UE.

3.1.8 Conclusões & ndash; Avaliação global do ETS da UE.

3.2.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.2.3 Relevância & amp; coerência.

3.2.6 Valor agregado da UE.

3.3.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.3.6 Valor agregado da UE.

3.4 Alocação gratuita e vazamento de carbono.

3.4.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.4.6 Valor acrescentado da UE.

3.5 Suporte para custos indiretos de CO2.

3.5.2 Adopção pelos Estados Membros.

3.5.3 Lógica de intervenção.

3.5.4 Identificando fatores potenciais para explicar as escolhas para aplicar a opção de compensação de custos indiretos.

3.5.8 Valor acrescentado da UE.

3.6 O sistema de conformidade (monitoramento, relatórios, verificação, credenciamento)

3.6.3 Lógica de intervenção.

3.6.8 Valor agregado da UE.

3.7 Sistema de registro.

3.7.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.7.7 Valor acrescentado da UE.

3.8 O financiamento NER 300.

3.8.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.8.6 Valor acrescentado da UE.

3.9 Alocação transitória gratuita para a modernização do setor de energia.

3.9.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.9.6 Valor agregado da UE.

3.10 ETS e pequenos operadores.

3.10.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.10.6 Valor acrescentado da UE.

3.11 Impacto do RCLE da UE nas famílias.

3.11.2 Lógica de intervenção.

3.11.6 Valor agregado da UE.

4 RESUMO DAS CONCLUSÕES.

5.1 Anexo I: Preços do carbono em todo o mundo.

5.2 Anexo II: Estimativa dos custos administrativos da alocação gratuita.

5.3 Anexo III: Bibliografia.

5.3.1 Documentos e legislação da UE.

5.3.2 Outras Literaturas.

5.4 Anexo IV: Lista de Acrônimos.

Fallmann, Hubert et al. 2018: Avaliação da Directiva EU ETS. Apoio à revisão do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE., Viena.

O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da União Européia: dez anos e contagem.

A. Denny Ellerman, Claudio Marcantonini, Aleksandar Zaklan; O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da União Européia: dez anos e contagem, revisão da economia e política ambiental, Volume 10, edição 1, 1 de janeiro de 2018, páginas 89-107, https: //doi/10.1093/reep/rev014.

Baixar arquivo de citações:

& # 169; 2018 Oxford University Press.

Este artigo fornece uma introdução ao Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da União Européia (UE) (ETS). Em primeiro lugar, descrevemos o desenvolvimento legislativo do RCLE da UE, a sua evolução desde a atribuição gratuita ao leilão e às regras centralizadas de atribuição, a sua relação com o Protocolo de Quioto e outros sistemas comerciais e a sua relação com outras políticas climáticas e energéticas da UE. Seguem-se uma avaliação do desempenho do RCLE da UE, que centra-se, em particular, nas emissões, nos preços de licenças e na utilização de compensações. Concluímos com uma discussão sobre o debate atual sobre o futuro do RCLE da UE e as propostas de mudanças no ETS da UE e no ambiente de política climática em que atua. (JEL: Q54, Q58)

Introdução.

O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da União Europeia (UE) (ETS) é o maior programa de capitalização e comércio do mundo e, sem dúvida, a mais importante aplicação baseada no mercado de princípios econômicos para o problema climático. Desde o seu início, o ETS da UE chamou a atenção e foi objecto de um debate vigoroso na arena pública. Na verdade, em 2007, foi o tema do simpósio na edição inaugural deste periódico. Os artigos desse simpósio discutiram a natureza excepcionalmente descentralizada do ETS da UE (Kruger, Oates e Pizer 2007) e forneceram uma avaliação inicial do seu desempenho durante os dois primeiros anos (Convery e Redmond 2007, Ellerman e Buchner, 2007). Em 2018, o ETS da UE iniciou o seu décimo primeiro ano, completando a sua segunda fase (2008-2018) e iniciou a sua terceira fase (2018-2020) sob uma base europeia sobre as emissões que está a diminuir indefinidamente a uma taxa anual de 1,74% .

O objetivo do segundo simpósio da revista sobre o ETS da UE é analisar e avaliar a literatura sobre o ETS da UE (a partir de 2018), para tirar algumas conclusões sobre o desempenho do ETS da UE e sugerir uma agenda de pesquisa para abordar questões não resolvidas . Neste artigo introdutório, fornecemos uma visão geral do ETS da UE para servir de plano de fundo para os tópicos discutidos nos outros dois artigos. No primeiro artigo, Hintermann, Peterson e Rickels (2018) examinam o comportamento do mercado e dos preços no EU ETS. O segundo artigo, de Martin, Muûls e Wagner (2018), aborda o efeito do RCLE-UE sobre o comportamento das empresas reguladas em relação à redução, competitividade e inovação.

O restante deste artigo é composto por três seções. A primeira seção descreve a história e a estrutura do ETS da UE. A segunda seção analisa o desempenho do EU ETS nos seus primeiros dez anos, com foco em emissões, preços de permissões e uso de compensações. 1 A seção final discute o debate contínuo sobre o design do ETS da UE e as mudanças recentemente adotadas e propostas nesse projeto.

História e Estrutura do ETS da UE.

O EU ETS é um sistema clássico de cap-and-trade. 2 A partir de 2018, o ETS da UE abrangeu cerca de 13.500 instalações estacionárias na empresa de eletricidade e nos principais setores industriais e em todas as emissões de aeronaves domésticas nos vinte e oito estados membros da UE, além de três membros do Área Econômica Européia estreitamente associada: Noruega, Islândia, e Liechtenstein. Aproximadamente dois bilhões de toneladas de dióxido de carbono (CO 2) e alguns outros gases de efeito estufa (GEE) estão incluídos no sistema, representando cerca de 4% das emissões globais de GEE em 2018 (Olivier et al., 2018). Além do seu tamanho em termos de alcance geográfico, número de fontes incluídas e valor das permissões, outra característica distintiva do ETS da UE é a sua implementação através de um quadro multinacional, nomeadamente a UE, e não através da acção de um único estado ou governo nacional, como assumido na maioria das teorias e como foi o caso da maioria dos outros sistemas de cap-and-trade. 3 Passamos agora ao processo pelo qual este sistema multinacional foi adotado.

Desenvolvimento Legislativo.

O primeiro sinal claro de que a UE poderia implementar um sistema de comércio de emissões era em 2000, quando a Comissão Européia emitiu o Livro Verde sobre o comércio de gases com efeito de estufa na União Européia (Comissão Européia 2000). Este documento discutiu se a UE deveria implementar um sistema de cap-and-trade a nível da UE para limitar as emissões de GEE (inicialmente CO 2) para complementar outras políticas e medidas, principalmente no que se refere à eficiência energética e às energias renováveis, implementadas principalmente a nível dos membros-estados . Esse sistema de cap-and-trade também foi visto como um meio para assegurar a realização dos objetivos a que a UE e seus Estados membros cometiram no Protocolo de Kyoto (KP). O Livro Verde apresentou as características essenciais do sistema que se tornaria o ETS da UE: um período experimental de 2005 a 2007, seguido de uma implementação total ao longo do período de 5 anos correspondente ao Primeiro Período de Compromisso do KP (2008- 2018). Após um extenso debate, a Directiva ETS foi aprovada por unanimidade pelo Conselho Europeu dos Estados-Membros em Outubro de 2003 (JOUE de 2003). E, como inicialmente foi proposto no Livro Verde, o ETS da UE entrou em vigor em 1º de janeiro de 2005, 15 meses depois.

Em Outubro de 2004, a Directiva ETS foi alterada pela directiva de ligação (JOUE de 2004), que permitiu aos proprietários das instalações afectadas substituir um número de compensações ainda pormenorizado (ou seja, créditos do Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo do KP [CDM ] e Joint Implementation [JI]) para cumprir a sua obrigação de submeter licenças da UE (EUAs) iguais às suas emissões anuais.

De acordo com o espírito de um período experimental inicial, a Directiva ETS pediu à Comissão Europeia que reveja os primeiros anos de experiência e propor alterações adequadas ao ETS. Esta revisão levou à adoção de revisões significativas ao ETS da UE no final de 2008 (JOUE 2009b), que regeria o sistema a partir de 2018. As alterações mais importantes nesta directiva alterada foram as seguintes: A importância do limite único a nível da UE só pode ser apreciada ao reconhecer a considerável descentralização da definição de limites e a atribuição de licenças de emissão que existia ao abrigo da Directiva ETS inicial.

adopção de um único limite para a UE que diminui em 1,74% ao ano;

a adoção do leilão como princípio de alocação básica, para ser totalmente aplicada ao setor de energia elétrica em 2018 e ser implantada em 2027 para os demais setores industriais;

continuou a alocação gratuita para instalações industriais de acordo com pontos de referência centralmente determinados durante a transição para o leilão completo; e.

mudanças nas provisões de compensação que limitaram ainda mais a sua utilização, ao mesmo tempo em que expandiram o escopo de ligação com os sistemas de cap-and-trade de GEE que poderiam se desenvolver em outras partes do mundo. 4.

Evolução de uma estrutura altamente descentralizada para um boné da UE.

Em seus primeiros anos, o ETS da UE pode ser melhor entendido como um sistema para a ligação obrigatória de vinte e cinco sistemas de estados membros, cada um dos quais estabeleceu seu próprio limite e determinou a distribuição de licenças para instalações afetadas, dia da Comissão Europeia. Mais especificamente, cada estado membro desenvolveu um Plano Nacional de Atribuição (NAP), indicando o número total de licenças a serem criadas e como elas seriam alocadas para as instalações afetadas no estado membro. Estes NAPs entrarão em vigor a menos que a Comissão rejeite o NAP porque não cumpriu determinados critérios na Diretiva ETS. Com efeito, o limite da UE era a soma dos limites dos membros-estado, e não seria conhecido definitivamente até o último NAP ter sido revisado e não rejeitado. 5.

O processo NAP provou ser longo, laborioso e sem recompensas para todos os interessados. Nos períodos de 2005-2007 e 2008-2018, a Comissão rejeitou vários pedidos de NAP, e vários Estados membros posteriormente contestaram estas decisões perante o Tribunal de Primeira Instância da Primeira Instância. 6 Não foi até 18 meses na fase I que o último NAP cancelou a revisão da comissão. O segundo ciclo NAP começou neste momento, 18 meses antes do início de 2008, mas os estados membros geralmente atrasaram a apresentação e o NAP final para limpar a revisão sem ser rejeitado fez isso um mês antes do início da fase II. Um ano depois, os Estados membros concordaram por unanimidade em abandonar o processo NAP e, em vez disso, adotar um limite de todo o sistema para entrar em vigor em 2018. O limite único exigiu um novo conjunto de princípios para a distribuição de licenças, o que explicamos a seguir.

Leilão e Regras de Alocação Centralizada.

As duas maiores críticas da primeira fase foram os "ganhos inesperados" da alocação gratuita e as supostas distorções competitivas resultantes das diferentes regras dos membros-estado para a alocação. Apesar dos fortes argumentos no Parlamento Europeu para o leilão significativo de licenças de emissão, a directiva finalmente acordada em 2003 exigiu que pelo menos 95% das licenças fossem alocadas livremente na primeira fase e 90% na segunda fase. Com efeito, a alocação livre descentralizada foi o preço político para garantir a participação de todos os Estados membros neste sistema de comércio multinacional. 7 O leilão abordou as duas críticas ao processo NAP de uma só vez. Ou seja, lucros inesperados seriam eliminados, assim como a possibilidade de distorções da concorrência no mercado único da UE. No entanto, o leilão seria implementado gradualmente, o que significava que os padrões sectoriais específicos da UE deveriam ser desenvolvidos para evitar distorções da alocação livre remanescente.

O momento em que o leilão seria introduzido e a alocação gratuita eliminada variou de acordo com o setor, a perda perceptível de competitividade no comércio internacional (fora da UE) e quando o Estado membro se juntou à UE. Por exemplo, a alocação gratuita terminou abruptamente em 2018 para o setor de eletricidade, que representa cerca de 50% das emissões do ETS da UE (Trotignon e Delbosc 2008, p.23) e foi considerado que não enfrentaria nenhuma ameaça competitiva internacionalmente. Algumas exceções foram permitidas para os novos Estados membros dependentes do carvão na Europa Oriental, que têm mais tempo para eliminar a alocação gratuita, desde que façam investimentos na modernização do setor elétrico.

Os setores industriais não elétricos, que enfrentam diferentes níveis de pressões competitivas não-comunitárias, permitiram uma eliminação mais gradual da alocação gratuita a partir de 2018. As alocações às instalações afetadas deveriam seguir padrões do setor da UE - chamados benchmarks - para serem desenvolvidos durante Fase II. Para essas instalações industriais, a alocação gratuita começaria em 80% do índice de referência completo em 2018, seria reduzida para 30% até 2020, e depois seria eliminada completamente em 2027. Além disso, se certos setores continuarem a enfrentar ameaças competitivas internacionalmente, eles irão receber alocações gratuitas no nível de benchmark completo, desde que a ameaça esteja determinada a existir. O desenvolvimento destes padrões sectoriais específicos a nível da UE para atribuição gratuita não foi uma pequena conquista.

Avaliação comparativa.

Talvez nenhum conceito tenha sido mais defendido e menos praticado durante o processo NAP para o primeiro e segundo períodos de negociação do que o benchmarking (Ellerman, Buchner e Carraro 2007). O problema básico era a falta de acordo sobre um benchmark adequado, que, quando combinado com as condições apressadas sob as quais os PANs foram desenvolvidos, tornava inevitável que a base para a alocação fosse emissões históricas. A directiva alterada resolveu esta questão ao exigir que os parâmetros de referência a nível da UE sejam a taxa média de emissão por unidade de produção para as instalações de cada sector ETS que constituem 10 por cento com as taxas de emissão de CO 2 mais baixas em 2005. Embora a definição de sectores fosse um desafio , foram estabelecidos benchmarks para cerca de cinquenta setores antes do final da fase II. Finalmente, esses benchmarks foram sujeitos a uma redução inicial de 6% para conciliar as alocações livres resultantes com o limite e os montantes previamente antecipados da UE, que serão leiloados e diminuirão pelo mesmo fator anual de 1,74% que agora regula todo o EU ETS (JOJ 2018a). Com o benchmarking resolvido, a única questão restante foi decidir o que fazer com a receita do leilão.

Receitas de leilão de licenças.

Uma regra fiscal de longa data para a UE fez receitas de licenças de leilão de um nonissue. Bruxelas não terá fontes independentes de receita, exceto os fornecidos pelos Estados membros através dos orçamentos de 7 anos. Por conseguinte, as receitas dos leilões de licenças serão distribuídas aos Estados membros como "direitos de leilão" estabelecidos por uma fórmula inversamente, mas vagamente, relacionada à renda per capita (Ellerman 2018).

Em menos de 10 anos, o ETS da UE evoluiu a partir de um sistema comercial em que as nações em grande parte soberanas inicialmente exigiam e recebiam um considerável poder discricionário na definição de limites e alocação a uma em que essas decisões são em todo o sistema, embora ainda negociadas entre os Estados membros participantes . No final, os limites nacionais significam pouco em um sistema com negociação plena e, sem dúvida, o que mais interessa aos governos participantes é a distribuição equitativa entre eles do valor criado pela restrição das emissões. A experiência do ETS da UE mostra que, embora seja possível uma alocação gratuita para obter o buy-in inicial das nações participantes e suas instalações afetadas, a alocação inicial ao setor privado do valor criado pelo limite não é para sempre e pode ser notavelmente breve.

Até agora, discutimos o ETS da UE como se fosse um sistema autônomo sem relação com acordos internacionais ou comércio com outros sistemas de GEE. No entanto, está inserido em um quadro internacional, e os aspectos internacionais do ETS da UE são uma fonte de mudanças contínuas.

O Relacionamento com o KP e Linkage.

O RCLE da UE foi proposto e justificado como um meio para que a UE e os seus Estados membros cumpram as suas obrigações de Quioto, mas a implementação não foi subordinada à entrada em vigor da KP, apesar da incerteza considerável em torno dessa questão quando a directiva inicial ETS foi adotada em 2003. Além disso, a implementação do RCLE da UE para além de 2018 (quando as obrigações de Quioto terminaram) não depende de outros acordos internacionais, embora a sua implementação seja frequentemente justificada com base no contributo da UE para tais acordos.

A evolução da UE em direção a uma ação independente também pode ser observada nas disposições de vinculação, um termo genérico que se refere tanto à aceitação de créditos internacionais quanto ao reconhecimento mútuo com outros sistemas de cap-and-trade. A dependência de um acordo internacional é explícita na delegação efetiva da Diretriz de vinculação da autoridade de certificação para a determinação de compensações internacionais aceitáveis aos procedimentos de credenciamento de MDL e JI da KP. No entanto, a UE manteve a sua prerrogativa (como comprador de créditos) para impor um limite quantitativo em todo o sistema de seu uso e proibir o uso de créditos de certos tipos de projetos, como grandes instalações hidráulicas e usinas geradoras de energia nuclear. Posteriormente, a Directiva alterada de 2009 declarou que os créditos de novos projectos (os certificados após 2018) não seriam aceitos na ausência de um acordo internacional pós-2018 ao qual a UE e o país anfitrião aderiram ou um acordo bilateral entre os dois. Além disso, o uso de crédito na fase III (2018-2020) foi limitado a cerca de 300 créditos adicionais além do limite de 1.3 bilhões imposto na fase II. 8 Finalmente, a Comissão Européia anunciou unilateralmente, em 2018, que os créditos de MDL gerados por projetos de gás industrial com alto potencial de aquecimento global não seriam aceitos para cumprimento além de 2018 sob nenhuma circunstância (JOUE 2018).

Estas restrições apertadas sobre o uso do crédito foram combinadas com provisões que tornam o reconhecimento mútuo (comércio irrestrito entre dois sistemas) mais fácil. Considerando que a Directiva ETS de 2003 limitou o reconhecimento mútuo às partes no KP (ou seja, sistemas nacionais), a directiva alterada deixou de mencionar o KP (ou qualquer acordo internacional), abrindo caminho para os acordos bilaterais. Além disso, ele menciona explicitamente a ligação potencial a sistemas subnacionais, desde que tenham um limite absoluto.

Até à data, existem dois exemplos de reconhecimento mútuo, um com a Austrália, anunciado e posteriormente abandonado, e o outro em negociação com a Suíça. 9 A característica distintiva destes dois exemplos de ligação potencial por reconhecimento mútuo é que eles são bilaterais - isto é, negociados entre as partes diretamente e não como parte de um acordo internacional maior. A UE também está observando a evolução do sistema sul-coreano e dos sistemas piloto ou nacionais na China, com o objetivo de uma eventual ligação.

These developments in restricting the use of project credits and opening up the potential for mutual recognition with other cap-and-trade systems reflect not only the willingness of the EU to act independently of international agreement but also an unstated policy of “graduating” countries that demonstrate the ability to generate project credits to full-fledged cap-and-trade programs that can be linked to the EU ETS, thereby forming the basis for an eventual global system of GHG emissions trading.

Before leaving the historical and contextual background of the EU ETS, we turn to the relationship of the ETS to other climate and energy policies in the EU.

Relationship to Other EU and Member-State Climate and Energy Policies.

Although the EU ETS has been heralded as the centerpiece of the EU’s climate policy, it is not the EU’s only climate policy instrument. In fact, the slogan for the EU’s present comprehensive climate policy is “20-20-20 by 2020,” which refers to the three targets to be achieved by 2020: a 20 percent reduction of GHG emissions from 1990 levels, a 20 percent share of total energy consumption from renewable energy, and a 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency. While the 20-20-20 slogan suggests that equal weight is being placed on achieving each of the three goals, their legal statuses vary. The GHG emissions-reduction and renewable energy–share targets are binding, whereas the energy-efficiency target is effectively aspirational, with no sanctions for noncompliance. 10.

It is important to note that the measures adopted by member states to achieve the renewable-energy and energy-efficiency targets affect the 40 percent of EU GHG emissions that are covered by the EU ETS. In particular, several member states, notably Germany and Spain, have provided strong incentives to develop wind and solar energy capacity within the electricity sector, such that the generation of electricity from renewable sources in these member states has had a demonstrable effect on the generation of electricity from CO 2 - emitting, fossil fuel–generating plants. For instance, in 2018 electricity generation from wind and solar accounted for 24 percent and 16 percent of total generation in Spain and Germany, respectively (ENTSO-E 2018). What remains to be seen is whether the concomitant reductions in demand for allowances will have a large or small effect on allowance prices. 11.

EU-level climate policy is not the only potential source of overlap with the EU ETS. Member states can adopt their own energy or climate policies, which may also affect that member state’s ETS emissions and thus affect the EU ETS-wide allowance price and distribution of abatement. For example, following the Fukushima accident in March 2018, the German government accelerated its policy to phase-out nuclear power by immediately shutting down eight reactors and directing the others to close down by 2022. Although one can debate how much zero-emission renewable energy can substitute for nuclear generation during and after the nuclear phase-out, the nuclear phase-out is likely to cause some increased reliance on fossil generation, both natural gas and coal-fired, and thus an increase in the demand for allowances and an increase in the EUA price.

In contrast, the UK’s carbon price floor is likely to have the opposite effect. In order to encourage investment in low-carbon generating capacity, the United Kingdom imposed a tax on fossil-fuel supplies to electricity-generating facilities in April 2018. Known as a carbon price support, the tax is supplementary to the EUA price and set at a level that will yield a carbon price of £16/ton CO 2 in 2018 and £30/ton CO 2 in 2020 (approximately €19/ton and €35/ton) when the EUA price and the UK price support will be combined. Given the current EUA price of around €8/ton, this measure imposes a significantly higher carbon cost on fossil-fuel electricity-generating facilities in the UK than in other EU member states. Thus, the UK carbon price floor can be expected to reduce coal and natural gas generation in the United Kingdom and hence the demand for allowances. As is the case for the other examples of overlapping policies, the direction of the effect on the EUA price is clear, but the magnitude is not.

Performance of the EU ETS.

With this background on the initial design, development, and implementation of the EU ETS, we now turn to a discussion of its performance through the end of phase II and into the first years of phase III.

Emission Reductions.

The first and most important measure of performance for any cap-and-trade system is emissions: that is, are emissions being reduced? Answering this question requires that we look at some of the determinants of CO 2 emissions, among which the level of economic activity is perhaps the most important.

Recent trends in emissions and economic activity.

Figure 1 compares the evolution of EU ETS emissions between 2004 and 2018 with the evolution of two measures of economic output: real gross domestic product (GDP) for the twenty-five EU member states that were initially part of the EU ETS (EU25) and the industrial component of real GDP—gross value added (GVA). GVA includes electricity generation and most closely approximates the underlying economic activity of the sectors included in the EU ETS. All three indices are normalized to the year 2004, the year preceding the start of the EU ETS.

Evolution of EU ETS emissions and economic output, 2004–2018.

As can be readily seen, the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession had a noticeable effect on levels of economic activity and CO 2 emissions. And indeed the reduction of GVA in the industrial sector surely accounts for most of the reduction in ETS emissions observed between 2007 and 2009. However, since the low points in 2009, EU25 GDP has returned to its earlier level, and the corresponding GVA has recovered to within 5 percent of its earlier peak. CO 2 emissions have followed a different path. There was a 3.3 percent rebound in 2018 (compared with a 7.7 percent gain in industrial output), but since then, CO 2 emissions have continued to decline, and since 2018 have been lower than in 2009 despite the recovery in economic activity. Over the 10-year period (2004–2018), GDP and industrial output have increased at average annual rates of 0.92 percent and 0.55 percent, respectively, whereas CO 2 emissions have declined by an average annual rate of 2.1 percent. The ratio of ETS emissions to GDP has declined at an average rate of 3.0 percent, compared with a rate of decline of about 1 percent between 2000 and 2004 ( Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis 2018 , p. 164). These data suggest that there has been some decoupling of emissions and economic activity in recent years.

It is important to clarify that the line for emissions in figure 1 indicates CO 2 emissions from those installations participating in the ETS in 2005 and 2006. It does not account for the addition of new countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) and sectors (aviation, chemicals, aluminum, and some non-CO 2 GHGs) since 2006. Over the years, these additions have expanded the coverage of the EU ETS by about 10 percent.

Another caveat is that other policy measures and the long-term trend toward increased energy efficiency have contributed to the reduction in CO 2 emissions within the EU ETS. As emphasized by Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2018) , sorting out the effects of the CO 2 price from other factors is no easy task. Nevertheless, ETS emissions fell by 20 percent over the past 10 years, notwithstanding the recovered, albeit barely growing, levels of economic activity.

The long-term outlook.

Whatever the contribution of the EU ETS to the reduction in emissions shown in figure 1 , there can be no doubt about the future trend of emissions in the EU ETS. The declining cap will force emissions continually lower over time. And, as can be seen in figure 2 , the emissions are on track to meet that declining cap.

Long-term perspective on EU ETS sector emissions and cap, 1990–2050.

As in figure 1 , the data in figure 2 exclude the increases in the coverage of the ETS since 2005. Figure 2 also shows the amount by which the cap was increased in phase II through offsets surrendered in each year and the much smaller amount by which offsets will increase the cap in phase III. The area between emissions and the cap plus offsets through 2018 shows the cumulative amount of allowances banked to date. These allowances will likely be used in later years as costs rise, so emissions may rise above the cap for some years. However, there can be no doubt that the long-term trend of EU ETS emissions is downward, even without considering the increased rate of decline of the cap from 2020 that the commission has recently proposed ( European Commission 2018 , 2018a ).

Allowance Prices.

As the most visible manifestation of a cap-and-trade system, allowance prices receive a great deal of attention and are often viewed as indicating how well the system is functioning. We next provide an overview of price trends, a discussion of the effect of banking on price behavior, and data on the volume of emissions trading.

Overview of price trends.

As illustrated by figure 3 , a highly visible price for EUAs has existed since the beginning of the EU ETS in 2005. 12 This figure shows the prices of the next December futures contracts, which have become the main trading instruments in the EU ETS. 13.

Next December EUA futures prices in phase I and phases II and III.

The EUA price has varied considerably over the first 10 years of the EU ETS, particularly in late 2006 and during 2007, when the prices of phase I and phase II allowances also diverged significantly and as it became clear that phase I and phase II constituted separate markets with differing degrees of expected scarcity. When the EU ETS first started, the price of EUAs was expected to be between €5 and €10, and the prices obtained in early 2005 reflected this expectation. Soon thereafter, the EUA price rose quickly, triggering a debate over the reasons for the unexpectedly high price. The debate lasted until late April 2006, at which time several member states reported their emissions for 2005, with all being lower than expected. In response, the price for both phase I and phase II allowances fell significantly: by 50 percent and 30 percent, respectively. During the summer of 2006, the phase I price held at around €15, but as autumn began and as it became increasingly clear that phase I emissions would be below the cap, the price for phase I EUAs fell to a few euro cents, while the price of phase II EUAs remained generally between €15 and €20. As phase II began, the phase II price reached almost €30 before it fell again by about 50 percent as a result of the economic crisis of late 2008. This time, however, the price drop was not specific to the EU ETS; many other asset values (e. g., stocks, bonds, crude oil) experienced similar declines. After recovering somewhat in early 2009, the EUA price experienced a 2-year period of stability—with a price around €15—until the summer of 2018, when it fell again by around 50 percent, to a new low of €7–8 in 2018, before falling yet again, to around €4 as phase III began. Despite predictions by some observers that the price would again fall to zero, it did not, with €3.65 being the lowest price observed. In the 18 months since the all-time low at the beginning of 2018, the EUA price has risen steadily to more than twice the early 2018 low.

The influence of banking on allowance prices.

An examination of the price of EUAs at the end of phases I and II and the size of the allowance surplus accumulated in each phase highlights the importance of banking and its role in establishing a floor on prices. More specifically, the surplus was 83 million allowances at the end of phase I and 1.8 billion allowances at the end of phase II ( European Commission 2018b ), yet the price did not go to zero in 2018 as it did in 2007. This is because the phase I surplus allowances could not be carried over for use in phase II, whereas phase II allowances can be banked for use in phase III and later years when the cap will be even lower and prices are expected to be higher.

Trading of EUAs.

Initially, EUA trading was over-the-counter, as it had been for other cap-and-trade programs, such as the U. S. sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) Trading Program. However, organized exchanges started offering intermediary and hedging services shortly after the EU ETS began, and their share has grown steadily, accounting for as much as 80 percent of the trades in 2018, as shown in figure 4 .

Monthly volume of EUA trading.

Two trends are clear. First, the overall volume of trades involving EUAs has steadily increased over the life of the program. At the beginning, more than a year passed before trading exceeded 50 million allowances (or tons of emissions) a month. Over the next 5 years, trading volumes grew steadily to ten times that amount. The second trend is the already-noted shift in the location of trading (i. e., from over-the-counter to exchanges). While several exchanges offer intermediary and hedging services, such as Nordpool in Norway and EEX in Germany, the most important exchange has been the European Climate Exchange (ECX, now ICE) in London, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the exchange volume in 2018 ( Point Carbon 2018a ). Most of the transactions on these exchanges are for futures. Spot transactions have accounted for a small percentage of trades, and the leading exchange for spot transactions, BlueNext in Paris, closed at the end of 2018.

The EU ETS has conducted the world’s boldest experiment to date in the use of offsets. Most cap-and-trade systems (e. g., US SO 2 and nitrogen oxides trading, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California CO 2 ) include provisions for offsets. However, such offsets are little (and often never) used because of the transaction costs of implementing monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures at off-system installations. The EU ETS broke new ground in two respects: it delegated offset certification authority to outside entities (i. e., those that already certify CDM and JI credits under the KP), and it imposed a quantitative limit on their use—approximately 11 percent of the phase II cap ( OJEU 2018b ). This experiment in offset use provides evidence on the use of offsets, their pricing relative to EUAs, and the origin of these substitute emission reductions, which we discuss next.

Offset issuance and use.

The EU ETS was not the sole market for CDM and JI credits; many were produced and bought by national governments throughout the world to satisfy obligations under the KP. However, the EU ETS was the largest single source of demand for these credits and the one with a relatively high price, thus providing considerable impetus for the creation of these credits. Table 1 presents data on the number of offsets submitted in lieu of EUAs to satisfy EU ETS compliance requirements through 2018 and the total number of these credits that were issued under the KP mechanisms (CDM and JI) in those years, including those used in the EU ETS.

Trends in numbers of EU ETS offsets surrendered and KP offsets issued.

Notes : Numbers are in millions. KP offset issuances correspond roughly to the compliance years of the ETS—that is, from May of the year indicated through April of the following year.

Several findings emerge from these data. First, half of the offsets issued under the KP through April 2018 were used for compliance in phase II of the ETS, reflecting the program’s status as the preferred, highest-return destination for these credits. Second, offset use started off very slowly, but it increased exponentially in the last three years of phase II, with half of the total offsets surrendered in 2018. Finally, the 1.3 billion phase II cap on offset use was not exceeded. Because unused entitlements to these credits (up to the phase II limit) can be converted to phase III allowances, the cumulative phase III cap will be higher by at least 240 million tons, and perhaps more, to the extent that credits from new projects are allowed within the additional 300 million limit for phase III.

Pricing of CERs versus EUAs.

Although the use of offsets (which were equal to about 10 percent of the phase II ETS cap) had some effect on the EUA price, the feature that has caught the most attention is the continual discount at which CERs (the primary source of credits until 2018) sold relative to EUAs despite being almost perfect substitutes for EUAs. 14 As shown in figure 5 , this discount ranged from 10 percent to 30 percent during the early years of phase II before increasing to 90 percent and higher in the final year of phase II.

EUA and CER pricing.

It is clear from figure 5 that the CER price tracked the EUA price for most of phase II, albeit with a widening discount. However, since the beginning of 2018, that relationship appears to have ended. Contributing factors undoubtedly include the very limited acceptability of CERs in the EU ETS after 2018 and the absence of demand in the alternative Kyoto market. 15.

We next turn to an accounting of the types of projects undertaken to generate these offsets and the countries in which these projects were located.

Project categories and countries of origin.

The most notable feature of table 2 is the predominance of projects reducing non-CO 2 , high-global-warming-potential (GWP) greenhouse gases. Industrial gases (hydrofluorocarbon [HFC] and nitrogen dioxide [N 2 O]) have GWPs that are thousands of times higher than that of CO 2 (=1), whereas methane (CH 4 ) reductions have a value that is twenty times higher than that of CO 2 . This means that although the costs of reducing a ton of emissions from these non-CO 2 projects may be higher than those from CO 2 reductions, the evidence suggests that the size of the GWP, which determines how many credits are issued (with each credit equal to 1 ton of CO 2 - emission reduction), more than makes up for the cost difference.

Project categories for issued CERs and ERUs.

Notes: Numbers are in millions.

As shown in table 3 , the national origin of offset credits is also concentrated, with emerging economies, especially China, accounting for the bulk of the CERs issued and the Ukraine and Russia accounting for most of the ERUs issued. There is no overlap in the issuance of CERs and ERUs because ERUs could be issued only by nations listed in annex I of the KP (generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and former Soviet Union countries) and CERs could be issued only by countries that, unlike annex I signatories of the KP, were not obligated to limit GHG emissions. Although the “Others” category in table 3 includes many countries in both the CER and ERU categories, they constitute a small percentage of the totals.

Country of origin for issued CERs and ERUs.

Notes: Numbers are in millions.

Summary and Conclusions: Whither Phase III?

The great surprise of the second phase of the EU ETS was that, as phase III started in 2018, the price paid to emit carbon was less than €5, not the €30 or more that had been indicated by 2018 futures prices in 2008 and that was generally expected at that time. This development has created a lively debate about the future of the EU ETS and its role in climate policy. This debate can be summarized as being between those who view the current, much-lower-than-expected price as indicating serious flaws in the EU ETS and those who argue that the low price shows that the system is working exactly as it should given all that has happened since 2008 (i. e., reduced expectations for economic growth in the Eurozone, increased electricity generation from renewable sources, the significant use of offsets), including the possibility that abatement may be cheaper than initially expected. Fundamentally, this debate reflects differing views of the objectives of climate policy itself: whether the objective is solely to reduce GHG emissions or also (and perhaps principally) to transform the European energy system. Although no one is suggesting that emissions have exceeded the cap, or that they will do so, current prices do not seem likely to lead to the kind of technological transformation that would greatly reduce Europe’s reliance on fossil fuels. Since mid-2018, the debate about the future of the EU ETS has focused on three issues—back-loading, restructuring, and the 2030 targets.

Back-loading.

Back-loading refers to changing the scheduled quantities of auctioned allowances so that fewer are auctioned in the early years and more are auctioned in the later years of phase II. After some debate, the decision was made in February 2018 ( OJEU 2018 ) to withdraw 900 million allowances from auctioning in 2018–2018 and to add them back in to auctioning in 2019–2020. 16 The debate about back-loading was, however, not so much about the timing of auctioned quantities and its effect on EUA prices as it was a proxy for the more important issue of restructuring: whether to adopt more significant changes in the design of the EU ETS in order to provide a stronger incentive for low-carbon investment in Europe. Viewed from this perspective, back-loading was only a first step toward reducing the near-term quantity of allowances in order to provide time to build a consensus for taking tougher actions before the withdrawn allowances would be reinjected into the system.

Restructuring and Targets for 2030.

In November 2018, not long after the formal submission of the back-loading proposal, the commission published a report, State of the Carbon Market , in which six alternatives for “restructuring” the EU ETS were presented ( European Commission 2018 ): (1) increasing the EU reduction target to 30 percent in 2020, (2) retiring allowances in phase III, (3) early revision (downward) of the 1.74 percent annual reduction in the cap, (4) extending the scope of the ETS to other sectors, (5) limiting access to international credits, and (6) creating a discretionary price management mechanism.

This report was followed in March 2018 by a green paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies ( European Commission 2018 ), which raised questions for debate about not only the restructuring of the EU ETS but also the post-2020 targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency and the coordination of those targets with the EU ETS. The context for this debate is both the absence of any post-2020 targets for the renewable energy and energy efficiency components of the present 20-20-20 by 2020 policy and the inability of the 1.74 percent annual reduction factor to reduce GHG emissions to 80 percent below 1990 emissions by 2050, the level called for in the 2050 Roadmap ( European Commission 2018 ).

A More Specific Proposal for 2030.

In January 2018, the commission followed up on the green paper with a more specific proposal for a comprehensive policy framework for climate and energy for 2020 to 2030 ( 2018 ). This proposal was remarkably sparse in recommendations for specific actions: a commitment to reduce EU GHG emissions by 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2030, the adoption of a Market Stability Reserve for the EU ETS that would withdraw and inject allowances after 2020 according to a quantitative formula, and an increase in the annual reduction in the EU-wide ETS cap after 2020, from 1.74 percent to 2.2 percent. The first two actions were presented as actions to be adopted in 2018: the 40 percent target in order to signal the EU’s contribution to the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Paris in late 2018, and the Market Stability Reserve as a technical fix to stabilize EUA prices in the EU ETS. The tightening of the EU ETS cap, as well as other possible measures, was to be decided after the May 2018 elections and the appointment of a new commission in late 2018.

The most remarkable feature of the more specific 2030 proposal is the absence of targets for renewable energy and energy conservation. There is considerable discussion of accompanying policies, but it is general, without proposing the type of specific member-state targets that exist now. A renewable energy target of 27 percent by 2030 is proposed, but it is an EU-wide goal and explicitly not broken down into the member-state targets that would give it legal force. What emerges most clearly from this document is its focus on the ETS, without the accompanying ancillary policies at the EU level that characterize current policy.

Although consideration and adoption of the specific proposals for 2030 have been slower than originally expected, notable progress has still been made. The Ukrainian crisis bumped consideration of the 40 percent EU-wide GHG reduction goal for 2030 from the spring agenda, but it was taken up and approved in October 2018 ( European Council 2018 ). The proposal to establish the Market Stability Reserve could not be considered until the new commission was appointed, but it was quickly taken up and an amended version was approved by the European Parliament in July 2018 ( European Parliament 2018 ) and expected to receive final approval by the European Council later in 2018. This amended version moves the start of the Market Stability Reserve forward by two years, to 2019, in order to receive the 900 million “back-loaded” allowances. This means that these allowances will not be reinjected into the system in 2019–2020. Finally, in July 2018, the commission forwarded the formal legislative proposal to increase the rate of decline in the post-2020 cap from 1.74 percent to 2.2 percent ( European Commission 2018a ). Stakeholder consultations and debate in the European Parliament and among member states will now occur as this final concrete proposal from the 2030 package moves toward final adoption.

Concluding Comments.

As the broader debate about climate and energy policy continues, it is important to keep in mind what has been achieved by the EU ETS. Absent a decision by the EU to abandon the program, which would require a super-majority, the EU ETS will march on with a continually declining cap, which, under all likely scenarios, will create continuing scarcity, thus virtually guaranteeing that a carbon price will be a permanent feature of the European economic landscape. Although one could question whether the consensus exists to tighten the EU ETS cap, repeal of the EU ETS appears highly unlikely. Moreover, if the current consensus no longer supports enforceable member-state targets for renewable energy, as seems to be the case, the EU ETS will be the only EU climate instrument in force after 2020. Thus, the EU ETS appears to be here to stay, and this remarkable experiment in climate policy will no doubt continue to provide economists and policy makers with fertile ground for research and debate for many years to come.

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The economic impact of the upcoming EU emissions trading system on airlines and EU Member States—an empirical estimation.

Martin Schaefer Janina Scheelhaase Email author Wolfgang Grimme Sven Maertens.

Objetivo.

In February 2009, the European Union’s (EU) Directive for the inclusion of aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for CO 2 - emissions came into force. From 2018 onwards, the EU-ETS will cover virtually all flights departing or arriving in the EU. As aircraft operators (i. e. airlines) will be required to hold emission allowances for all flights that are subject to the EU-ETS, the economical impacts of the system are currently being discussed. This paper aims at estimating and analysing the economical impact of the EU-ETS on the aviation sector in total, on selected groups of airlines and on the administering states.

Materials and methods.

This paper describes a simulation model for the economical impact of the EU-ETS. According to current plans, the initial allocation of emission allowances to airlines will be based on a benchmark which is calculated by dividing the 2004–2006 CO 2 - emissions by the transport performance of the year 2018. The simulation model calculates CO 2 emissions and transport performance of European aviation for the timeframe 2004–2018. The approach is based on flight schedules for passenger and cargo air traffic coupled to an aircraft performance module. By use of this model, the benchmark and hence the initial allocation of emission allowances to airlines can be estimated. Using assumptions on the development of the CO 2 allowance price, the economical impacts of the EU-ETS can be discussed.

Results and discussion.

The economic effects of the upcoming EU-ETS on the aviation sector in total, on selected groups of airlines and on the administering states are analysed and discussed. It is shown that additional to the freely allocated allowances, nearly all aircraft operators need to purchase allowances for about one third of their emissions in 2018. The total cost for the aviation sector is expected to be in the range between 1.9 and 3.0 billion € in 2018. Certain airline groups and administering EU States will be affected very differently by the new EU legislation. It is shown that particularly European network carriers will be affected by a competitive disadvantage compared to non-EU airlines.

1. Introdução.

In July 2008, the European Council and the European Parliament agreed to include international aviation into the existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme for the limitation of CO 2 - emissions. The Directive came into force in February 2009 [ 8 ]. Aircraft operators will be obliged to surrender allowances for virtually all commercial flights into, within or out of the EU from 2018 onwards. The EU-ETS will affect both European and third-country airlines. The European Commission justifies this approach by stating that a distortion of competition in the international airline sector needs to be avoided to the most possible extent and that this approach will improve the environmental effectiveness of the scheme. Several non-EU states, however, have expressed doubts regarding the environmental effectiveness of the EU-ETS and whether the EU approach conforms to international law.

A number of economic studies on these controversial issues have been conducted lately, e. g. by Faber, van der Vreede and Lee [ 13 ], Forsyth, Dwyer and Spurr [ 15 ], Boon et al. [ 5 ], Forsyth [ 14 ] as well as Scheelhaase, Grimme and Schaefer [ 25 ]. These studies focus on different aspects of the topic such as the method of initial allocation of allowances, the impacts on tourism as well as the economic impacts on different airline types. A meta-study by Anger and Köhler [ 4 ] reviews the impact assessments of the EU-ETS as developed in 9 different studies published between 2005 and 2009. It is found that some of the assumptions and results differ considerably, such as assumptions with regard to the cost pass-through rates used in the estimations. Other assumptions, in contrast, are similar in all of the reviewed studies, such as the assumed span for future allowance prices. Two major points of critic Anger and Köhler are bringing forward are an over-simplification of the calculations applied in the reviewed studies, and that some of the studies are based on assumptions different to the eventual content of the directive which came into force in 2009.

This paper analyses how the inclusion of aviation into the EU-ETS will affect the air transport sector both economically and ecologically. In order to target these questions, an empirical simulation model was developed, which goes far more into detail than those applied in previous studies. The model is based on global flight schedules of the Official Airline Guide (OAG) supplemented by a DLR developed flight plan for cargo and integrator airlines. All flight movements are simulated by DLR aircraft performance software in order to calculate the specific fuel consumption and CO 2 - emissions. By employing this model, current and future CO 2 - emissions and transport performance data of European aviation will be estimated. Furthermore, the economic effects of the upcoming EU-ETS on both the aviation sector and individual airlines will be estimated and discussed. In contrast to earlier studies, our model’s assumptions are in line with the contents of the final directive.

This paper is organized as follows: Initially, an overview of the EU legislation on emissions trading and aviation for the years 2018 and beyond is provided (chapter 2). Subsequently, our modelling approach (chapters 3 and 4) and the main economic and ecologic effects for the aviation sector as well as for the EU member States are presented and discussed (chapter 5). Finally, conclusions about the impacts on costs, airfares and competition within the aviation sector are drawn (chapter 6).

2 Political background.

Virtually all flights departing from or arriving at EU airports will be covered from 2018 onwards. Domestic flights will be subject to the same rules as international air traffic. If any non-EU country introduced alternative measures with similar climate protecting effects, the geographical scope of the ETS could be modified such that flights arriving from or departing for this particular country are excluded from the scheme.

Aircraft operators will be obliged to hold and surrender allowances for CO 2 - emissions. Allowances are required for flights by fixed-wing aircraft with a maximum take-off mass of 5,700 kg or above. Flights performed under visual flight rules and rescue flights (amongst a number of other exceptions) are excluded from the scheme.

Exemptions will also be granted for flights performed in the framework of public service obligations (PSO) on routes within outermost regions or on PSO routes where the capacity offered does not exceed 30,000 seats per year. Also excluded from the EU-ETS will be flights performed by a commercial air transport operator operating either fewer than 243 flights per four-month period for three consecutive four-month periods (so-called ‘de minimis’ clause) or flights with total CO 2 - emissions lower than 10,000 tonnes per year. The ‘de minimis’ clause was added in order to reduce administrative costs for operators with a low number of flights to and from Europe.

Regulations for emission monitoring and reporting will take effect in 2018 while an emission cap for all aircraft operators will be introduced in 2018.

In the first year of the inclusion of aviation into the EU-ETS, the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to aircraft operators shall be equivalent to 97% of the historical aviation emissions (so-called overall “cap”). The historical aviation emissions will be calculated on the basis of the average total emissions of the years 2004–2006 borne by all aircraft operators taking part in the scheme. The historical emissions will be defined by the European Commission with technical assistance from Eurocontrol.

Initially, allowances will be allocated to aircraft operators mostly free of charge. In the year 2018, 85% of the allowances shall be allocated for free. The method of allocating allowances to aircraft operators will be harmonised within the European Union.

The total number of allowances allocated to each aircraft operator will be determined by a benchmark which is calculated in three consecutive steps: First, the share of auctioned allowances is subtracted from the overall “cap”. Second, the remaining CO 2 - emissions will be divided by the sum of verified tonne-kilometre data for flights falling under the geographical scope of the EU-ETS in the monitoring year 2018, as reported by all participating aircraft operators. Third, the specific amount of allowances each operator receives is calculated by multiplying the respective individual tonne-kilometre value of the monitoring year with the benchmark. Each operator’s revenue tonne-kilometres are calculated by multiplying the mission distance (great-circle-distance plus an additional fixed surcharge of 95 km) by the payload transported (cargo, mail and passengers). For the calculation of the performed tonne-kilometres, each passenger including baggage is assigned a value of 100 kg.

In 2018, allowances allocated to aircraft operators will be valid within the aviation sector only. However, additional permits can be purchased from other sectors or from the project based Kyoto instruments “Joint Implementation” and “Clean Development Mechanism”. Allowances not used in 2018 can be ‘banked’ to the third trading period of the EU-ETS (2018–2020).

Allowances not allocated free of charge (15%) will be auctioned by the Member States. The revenues should be used to tackle climate change in the EU and third countries, inter alia, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the impacts of climate change or to fund research and development in these fields.

The EU Directive for the period 2018–2020 [ 8 ], as it was agreed in December 2008, aims at improving and extending the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community. Due to its broader nature, it adopts regulations for all sectors included in the system and very few aviation-specific rules. It is understood that most of the regulations for the first year of the inclusion of aviation into the EU-ETS which are described above will be further applied. However, the total quantity of emission allowances to be allocated to aircraft operators shall then be equivalent to only 95% of the historical aviation emissions, multiplied by the number of years in the eight-year period. The use of the project based Kyoto instruments “Joint Implementation” and “Clean Development Mechanism” will be lowered significantly for aircraft operators. In the period 2018 until 2020, aircraft operators may use emission permits from “Joint Implementation” and “Clean Development Mechanism” only up to 1.5% of the amount of allowances they are required to surrender per year (in 2018: 15%). However, purchasing emissions permits from stationary sources is possible without limitations.

3 Modelling air transport’s CO 2 - emissions and transport performance.

According to DLR calculations based on EUROSTAT figures for 2007, non-scheduled flights account for about 12% of all IFR passenger flights [ 11 ]. With OAG data containing all scheduled and some of the unscheduled air traffic, the percentage of non-OAG passenger flights should be smaller than this figure.

A large percentage of these non-scheduled flights can supposed to be operations exempted from the EU-ETS, e. g. flights with aircraft of less than 5,700 kg maximum take-off mass or flights falling under the ‘de minimis’ clause.

As some flights are typically cancelled, OAG will slightly overestimate the real traffic volume from scheduled services. This overestimation, in turn, may compensate for the unscheduled passenger flights not included in OAG.

For the air cargo market, in contrast, OAG data availability is less satisfying, as most integrator services and all ad-hoc services are missing. In order to improve the data availability in the cargo sector, we have compiled a flight plan comprising a presumably large part of the non-OAG all-cargo flights from and to Europe. This additional schedule mainly consists of double-checked flight information found in airport timetables, in press releases of air cargo companies and on websites run by aviation enthusiasts.

The aircraft performance software VarMission developed at the DLR Institute of Propulsion Technology was employed to calculate fuel consumption and CO 2 - emissions of each flight in the flight schedules. VarMission is written in Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). A Microsoft Access database contains aircraft and engine data. For this study, the tool uses aircraft models from the EUROCONTROL Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) [ 10 ]. This database contains information on 91 aircraft types including most large airliners. Aircraft for which no data are available can be represented by models with similar characteristics. In order to speed up the calculation process, interpolation tables produced by VarMission for all aircraft models were used in this study, which contain pre-calculated flight mission protocols for different ranges and payloads as well as the fuel burn along these profiles. Using these look-up tables in combination with interpolation methods, fuel burn and emissions can be calculated for each flight in the flight schedules. Fuel burn and emissions calculations based on BADA data have a history of being used for global emission inventories (e. g. the FAA’s SAGE inventories) and can be considered a standard for such applications [ 12 ].

The VarMission software considers taxiing on the ground, take-off, climb, cruise and descent flight phases. The fuel consumption of a flight is calculated iteratively, reducing the aircraft mass (due to fuel burn) in each calculation step. Since the take-off mass of a flight is initially unknown, the program performs the calculation process “backwards”, i. e. starting with the aircraft’s empty weight plus payload, considering reserve fuel quantities and analysing all flight phases in reverse order. The flight distance of each flight was estimated by applying an empirical “inefficiency” factor to the great-circle distance between origin and destination airports. The factor ranges from 1.06 on short-range flights (up to 500 km) to around 1.03 on long-range missions.

The payload assumed for each flight could be calculated based on the aircraft’s maximum payload multiplied by a flight’s weight load factor. While flight schedules contain information on payload capacity available on each flight, actual passenger numbers and the (total) payload transported had to be estimated. For this purpose, each flight in the schedules was supplemented by load factor data from different sources. The sources used to determine both seat load factors and overall weight load factors include the ICAO Traffic by Flight Stage databank and ICAO’s Air Carrier statistics [ 19 ]. By combining such data with the available seats and payload capacities from the schedules, an estimation of the relevant transport performance for the years 2004–2008 could be provided.

As the EU-ETS will be introduced in 2018, forecast flight schedules were produced based on the latest available scheduled data. Given the current economic situation, no traffic growth was assumed between 2008 and 2018. For the years 2018–2018, on the other hand, regional growth factors derived from common manufacturers’ forecasts were applied to the base year flight schedules in order to produce a forecast up to the year 2018. The introduction of more fuel-efficient aircraft, potential improvements in the field of Air Traffic Management and a further increase in terms of load factors were considered by assuming a 1% efficiency improvement per year resulting in a corresponding reduction of fuel-consumption and emissions per tonne-kilometre. This way, a reliable and best possible estimation of traffic volumes and CO 2 - emissions of European flight operations up to the year 2018 could be performed.

Forecasts of traffic volumes and CO 2 - emissions were created for this study covering the years 2018 to 2018. In our forecast of traffic volumes we are assuming that recent market developments like heavily fluctuating oil prices, as well as the costs for participating in the EU-ETS, will have no sustainable negative impact on future aviation growth in the medium and long-term. This is because a number of studies indicate that airlines will be able to pass on, to a large extent, the additional costs to the customers, of whom many are not very price sensitive (see e. g. [ 6 ], [ 26 ]). However, we are taking into account the 2008/2009 worldwide recession. We assume a recovery point in the second half of 2009, leading to 2018 traffic volumes equal to those of 2008 before the recession (i. e. until August). From September 2018 onwards the forecast is based on our data for the last 12 months before the recession in combination with average annual growth rates derived from the most common manufacturers’ forecasts, i. e. the Airbus Global Market Forecast [ 1 ], Boeing’s Current Market Outlook [ 3 ] and Rolls-Royce’s Market Outlook [ 24 ]. Additionally, the forecast of the ICAO Forecast and Economic Subgroup (FESG) was analysed [ 18 ]. Each of these forecasts provides average annual growth rates for the transport performance on either region or country pair level up to 20 years into the future. For our model, an average forecast was created, using the mean growth rate of all four market forecasts for each region or country pair. The projected growth for air traffic from and to Europe in terms of passenger-kilometres lies between 3.4% per annum (domestic flights within Western Europe) and 6.0% per annum (flights between South East Asia and Western Europe). In the cargo market, forecasted growth rates are typically higher and vary between 4.15% (within Europe) and 7.45% (China-Europe). A sensitivity analysis showed that the use of just one of the original forecasts mentioned above would not have resulted in significantly different results on a global scale.

For the development of the CO 2 - Emissions, however, a factor of 1% per year for autonomous efficiency gains is included in the forecast. This value is based on long-term observations of the air transport system and correlates with the fuel efficiency target of IATA for the years 2000 to 2018 [ 16 ]. The factor represents the efficiency gains that will be achieved in the air transport system by e. g. optimisation of operational procedures, air traffic control or the introduction of larger, more modern and more fuel-efficient aircraft.

4 Modelling the upcoming EU-emission trading system.

4.1 Overview.

Given the world-wide flight movements, the transport performance in tonne-kilometres and CO 2 - emissions, core elements of the upcoming EU-ETS can be modelled. Our modelling approach is based on the Directive 2008/101/EC [ 9 ]. The regional scope assumed for the emissions trading scheme comprises all flights from and to the European Union (plus outermost regions). While the participation of EFTA (European Free Trade Association) states seems likely, flights within and between Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and non-EU-countries are not included in our model.

The ‘de minimis’ clause (see chapter 2) was incorporated in the model and operators with less than 10,000 t CO 2 emitted per year or fewer than 729 flights per year in 2018 were identified. The results of the model show that none of the airlines contained in the OAG flight schedules and operating to/from the EU emits less than 10,000 t CO 2 per year. However, 95 operators were identified with less than 729 flights per year, representing about 1% of the total emissions and 2% of the revenue tonne-kilometres according to the reporting standards of the EU-ETS. For simplification, further checks for public service obligation (PSO) routes or routes within the outermost regions were omitted, as both the emissions and RTKs of these flights are negligible with less than 0.1% of the total RTKs performed on flights to or from the EU. Actually, most PSO routes in the EU will require emission allowances, as the exclusion criterion of 30,000 seats offered annually (which corresponds to only 82 seats per day) is exceeded by most of them.

The most important elements of modelling the economic effects of the upcoming EU-ETS for aviation are the initial allocation of CO 2 - emission allowances and the future development of CO 2 allowance prices.

4.2 Initial allocation of CO 2 - emission allowances.

In compliance with the EU Directive [ 9 ], a passenger weight of 100 kg and an addition of 95 km to the great-circle distance of each flight need to be considered when calculating the reported RTKs.

4.3 Development of the CO 2 - emission allowances price until 2020.

The carbon price is directly determined by the abatement costs for an additional unit of CO 2 . This is because emitters can either abate CO 2 or buy CO 2 permits to comply with their individual reduction target in an ETS. In the course of time, CO 2 abatement in the EU will become more costly due to the tightening of the EU-ETS overall cap. A number of researchers believe that the ambitious target set by the European Commission to reduce CO 2 - emissions by 2020 can only be realised by the deployment of CCS coal plants (coal plants that are equipped with carbon capture and storage technology) and renewable energy sources. In the medium term it could become viable at prices of 35 €/t CO 2 to 40 €/t CO 2 [ 21 ]. For this reason, we assume a maximum price of 40 € per tonne of CO 2 in the period 2008–2018.

The possibility of ‘banking’ unused allowances from one trading period to another will ensure a relatively common EUA price across both trading periods (2008–2020).

The inclusion of the aviation sector as well as the aluminium, petrochemical and ammonia industry into the EU-ETS starting from the year 2018 will not raise EUA prices significantly. This was shown by a number of studies, for instance by [ 20 ] and [ 6 ]. But the progressively rising level of auctioned allowances and the ambitious overall greenhouse gas cap will lead to rising prices for EUAs until 2020.

The prices for CERs and ERUs will mirror the EUA price developments because the prices for these project-based permits are in principle also determined by the factors explained above. Due to a higher risk of non-delivery related to CERs and ERUs (compared to EUAs), CER/ERU prices are currently a bit lower than EUA prices. We believe that this spread between the prices for both kinds of permits, which at present amounts to about 4 €, will persist in the future.

Assumptions on the EUA and CER/ERU price development in the future.

4.4 Limitations and assumptions in our model.

As it is the case with every model, our model contains several simplifications compared to reality. The following paragraph discusses some of the implications of the assumptions the model is based on.

In principle, several scenarios concerning the pass-through of acquisition costs and opportunity costs of freely allocated allowances can be considered. In case a partial or full pass through occurs, it is reasonable to assume that a demand reaction will follow, depending on the extent of the price increase and the price elasticity of demand. In the model presented herein, we assume no change in passenger demand or airline supply in reaction to the EU-ETS. This is due to the fact that reliable data on the price elasticity of demand for air travel does not exist for this issue. This implies the assumption that none of the costs for the EU-ETS will be passed through to passengers and shippers of air cargo. Furthermore, our forecasting model increases frequencies on existing routes, but does not take into account potential impacts of the EU-ETS on airline strategies concerning aircraft size, frequencies or the discontinuation of existing routes. As the results of our model presented in this paper are focused on the assessment of cost impacts for the airline industry in the rather short-term until 2018, we are not predicting long-term changes in market, fleet or network structures.

5.1 World-wide transport performance.

Comparison of selected model results with ICAO data for world-wide scheduled traffic.

Kilometres flown in million (modelled)

Kilometres flown in million (ICAO)

ASK in billion (modelled)

ASK in billion (ICAO)

RPK in billion (modelled)

RPK in billion (ICAO)

RTK in million (modelled) a.

RTK in million (ICAO)

a assuming a passenger weight of 90 kg.

DLR model results; ICAO data from [ 17 ] and [ 2 ]

It can be observed that, on a global level, the goodness of fit between modelled transport performance and ICAO data is within a range of 5%. Generally, it seems that the model overestimates available seat-kilometres (ASK) and revenue passenger-kilometres (RPK) slightly compared to ICAO statistics. The total tonne-kilometres (RTK) calculated are very close to the reference, but given the incomplete coverage of all-cargo flights in our model, this seems to be consistent with the slightly overestimated ASKs and RPKs. Looking at the reference data from another angle, it is also questionable whether data published by ICAO can be considered as 100% accurate. This is because ICAO is dependent on data delivered by its contracting states as well as on data availability. As a result, the quality of ICAO data is likely to be rather heterogeneous.

Data availability for a validation on a more detailed geographical level is problematic. While in the United States a very accurate set of air transport data is provided by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, airline-specific information on flown aircraft kilometres or revenue ton kilometres is not available for other world traffic regions. Based on the data from the United States we conclude that also on a more detailed geographical level, our estimations show a very good fit compared to published data. On average, the accuracy for modelled passenger kilometres for US airlines shows a slight overestimation of around +1%.

5.2 Transport performance and CO 2 - emissions for flights to/from the EU & allowances available to aircraft operators.

Historical and forecasted transport performance and CO 2 - emissions (Transport performance assumes a passenger weight of 90 kg; The period of time not modelled is marked by “??”). Source: DLR model results based on OAG data [ 23 ] supplemented by all-cargo services from and to Europe.

Historical transport performance and CO 2 - emissions of flights to/from the EU.

RTK in million (modelled) a.

CO 2 - Emissions in million tonnes (modelled)

a assuming a passenger weight of 90 kg.

DLR model results.

According to our model, the aviation sector will receive 175.5 million allowances for the emission of CO 2 in the year 2018, since the owner of one allowance has the right to emit one tonne of CO 2 . 85% of all allowances, i. e. 149.2 million will be allocated free of charge while the remaining 15% (26.3 million allowances) will be auctioned. Considering the estimated range for the future price of allowances (25 €–40 €), governments of the EU Member States will receive between 660 million and 1050 million € as a revenue from the auctioning of allowances.

It is worth noting that our model seems to underestimate aviations’ emissions under the EU ETS in the year 2008 by 5% according to unofficial figures presented by the European Commission in May 2018 [ 25 ]. This slight underestimation may have numerous reasons but can only be analyzed when the highly political EU ETS cap will be officially published. Currently, its publication is postponed until 2018.

5.3 Benchmark calculation.

Forecasted transport performance and CO 2 - emissions of flights to/from the EU.

RTK in million (modelled) a.

CO 2 - Emissions in million tonnes (modelled)

a assuming a passenger weight of 90 kg.

Source: DLR model results.

Carriers operating less than 729 flights per year in the EU will not be obliged to participate in the EU-ETS. As a consequence, their transport performance will have to be excluded from the calculation of the benchmark. In the year 2018, this applies to 95 operators with 5,166 million reported tonne-kilometres, representing approximately 2% of the total tonne-kilometres of all flights from and to EU airports. The benchmark, calculated by dividing the amount of freely allocated allowances by the tonne-kilometres reported for the year 2018 is estimated by our model at 0.60 kg CO 2 per RTK.

5.4 Freely allocated allowances vs. emissions in 2018 and acquisition costs for the aviation industry.

An important parameter for estimating the costs of the EU-ETS for the aviation sector is the difference between the number of allowances allocated for free and the actually needed allowances for the first trading period. By applying our forecasting method, we estimate that the CO 2 - emissions of flights to and from airports in the EU will amount to a total of about 226.4 million tonnes in 2018. Considering the ‘de minimis’ clause and excluding operators with less than 729 flights per year, emissions of 223.6 million tonnes of CO 2 will be subject to the EU-ETS.

With 149.2 million allowances allocated for free (see above), airlines will need to buy allowances for about 74.4 million tonnes of CO 2 - emissions. Taking into account the estimated price span of 25 € to 40 € for allowances, the cost for the acquisition of allowances will be between 1.9 and 3.0 billion € for the entire aviation sector subject to the EU-ETS (in 2018). The results also show that CO 2 allowances for about 48.1 million tonnes will have to be purchased by aircraft operators from other sectors, as only 175.5 million new allowances will be available to the aviation sector on the basis of Directive 2008/101/EC.

5.5 Comparison of acquisition costs for different groups of airlines.

As the forecast of individual airlines’ future emissions is associated with rather large uncertainty, for the following analysis we focus on groups of airlines, clustered by their geographical origins and business models.

Comparison of initial allocation, forecasted emissions and acquisition costs for different airline groups.

10 largest EU network carriers.

10 largest non-EU network carriers.

10 largest EU low cost and charter carriers.

Free allocation of EU-allowances in Mt for 2018.

Forecasted CO 2 - emissions for 2018 in Mt.

Percentage of free allocation.

EU allowances to be acquired in Mt.

Acquisition cost for additional allowances (25 € per allowance) in million €

Acquisition cost for additional allowances (40 € per allowance) in million €

DLR model results.

Our model confirms earlier findings by the authors [ 25 ] that EU-based network carriers will be affected by a competitive disadvantage compared to their non-EU-based counterparts: Table 5 shows that the percentage of allowances allocated for free compared to the allowances required for the airlines’ operations remains at a significantly lower level for EU-based network carriers than for non-EU carriers. This can be explained by the fact that EU-based carriers operate their feeder network under the ETS, while non-EU-based carriers operate only long-haul flights with comparably lower specific emissions under the ETS.

The percentage of freely allocated allowances for low cost and charter carriers (LCC) is in between the corresponding percentages for EU-based and non-EU-based network carriers. While most low cost routes are relatively short, such airlines operate at high seat densities, high passenger load factors and with modern aircraft, therefore achieving a relatively high percentage of free allocation. However, as we assume the growth of the LCCs to be in line with overall market growth rates, a higher growth of traffic and emissions could effectively result in a lower percentage of free allocation and, consequently, higher acquisition costs.

5.6 Revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances per EU Member State.

in the case of an aircraft operator with a valid operating license granted by a Member State, the Member State which granted the operating license in respect of that aircraft operator; and.

in all other cases, the Member State with the greatest estimated attributed aviation emissions from flights performed by that aircraft operator in the base year.

Auction revenues per EU member state.

Proportional allocation, according to attributable aviation emissions in 2018.

Allocation according to 2018 emissions of administered airlines.

Difference in auction revenues in million EUR per year.

Administering member state.

Percentage share of attributable CO2 emissions in Mt.

Auction revenues in million EUR, 25 EUR per ton.

Auction revenues in million EUR, 40 EUR per ton.

Percentage share of CO2 emissions in Mt.

Auction revenues in million EUR, 25 EUR per ton.

Auction revenues in million EUR, 40 EUR per ton.

25 EUR allowance value.

40 EUR allowance value.

DLR model results.

Share of auction revenues for EU member states by allocation mechanism. Source: DLR model results.

This can firstly be explained by the fact that some of the biggest airlines of the world operate under a license granted by one of these Member States mentioned above, e. g., British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France/KLM, etc. Secondly, due to the relatively high number of scheduled flights served within as well as to and from these EU Member States, especially to and from intercontinental destinations, the amount of attributed emissions is remarkably bigger compared to those of the remaining Member States.

As shown in the table above, both UK and Germany will benefit to a large extent from the interpretation (of Article 3d) that allowances will be auctioned according to the emissions share of the administered airlines. This could be justified by the fact that both countries administer most large network carriers, particularly those from non-EU countries, and will have to bear a relatively high administrative burden. However, given that air transport markets are widely liberalised and at least for intra-European flights of Community carriers the nationality does not matter any more, such an interpretation seems to be problematic from an equity point of view. Therefore a very thorough interpretation of Article 3d is highly recommendable.

6 Conclusion.

From 2018 onwards, the EU emissions trading system will be applied to the aviation sector and cover virtually all flights departing or arriving in the EU. The initial allocation of emission allowances to airlines will be based on a benchmark which is calculated by dividing historical CO 2 - emissions of the airlines participating in the scheme by their transport performance (expressed in revenue tonne-kilometres) of the year 2018. In this paper, we have applied a DLR-developed simulation model. This model is one of the first of its kind capable of simulating the future development of the aviation sector. In particular, it allows for the estimation of the economic impact of the EU-ETS on both the aviation sector in total and on selected groups of airlines. The five main results of our analysis can be summarised as follows:

First, if the EU will be successful in integrating non-EU carriers into the EU-ETS as planned today, a relatively ambitious CO 2 control will be possible: Our results show that roughly one third of global aviation’s CO 2 - emissions will be subject to the new regulation.

Second, the benchmark, which is the basis of the initial allocation of allowances to aircraft operators, is estimated by our model at 0.60 kg CO 2 per RTK. Apart from very few exceptions, virtually all passenger airlines will need to purchase additional CO 2 allowances for their operations in 2018 and beyond. On average, carriers operating from and to EU airports will have to purchase allowances for about one third of their emissions in 2018.

Third, based on the estimated range of future allowance prices (25–40 € per ton of CO 2 ), the total cost for the aviation sector is expected to be in the range between 1.9 and 3.0 billion € in the year 2018 alone. As the potential for endogenous emission reduction in the aviation sector is rather low, the airlines will have to buy allowances for about 48.1 million tonnes of CO 2 from stationary sources taking part in the EU-ETS.

Fourth, a more detailed analysis of selected airline groups reveals that resulting from the EU-ETS, European network carriers will be affected by a competitive disadvantage compared to non-EU airlines. For EU-based carriers, the percentage of freely allocated allowances compared to the total allowances required will remain below the corresponding level for non-EU carriers. This is because the former operate their feeder network with relatively high specific emissions under the ETS, while the latter operate only long-haul flights to and from Europe. This implies a systematic cost disadvantage for European network operators.

Fifth, our estimations of the revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances show that only a few EU Member States will generate considerably high amounts: United Kingdom, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Spain and Italy. Due to different possible interpretations of the rules concerning the auctioning of allowances, some EU States may profit more than others. Therefore, a very thorough interpretation of these rules is highly recommendable.

Finally, it becomes evident that the integration of aviation into emission trading schemes is a particularly difficult challenge both from an environmental economics and political standpoint. To jeopardize matters, emissions trading systems designed fundamentally different will be introduced globally within the next 5–10 years with some of them being already in force (New Zealand, e. g.). Linking the EU trading scheme with these systems will be technically complex and may lead to competitive distortions within the aviation sector. Therefore a global system or an international harmonized approach for the limitation of aviation’s CO 2 emissions would be the best solution.

Aircraft performance data contained herein are based on data drawn from the EUROCONTROL Base of Aircraft Data (BADA). It is to be noted that the aircraft performance models and data contained in BADA have been developed by EUROCONTROL from a set of aircraft operational conditions available to EUROCONTROL. EUROCONTROL has validated BADA aircraft models only for those conditions and can therefore not guarantee the model’s accuracy for operating conditions other then the reference conditions.

Referências.

Informações sobre direitos autorais.

This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Autores e afiliações.

Martin Schaefer 1 Janina Scheelhaase 2 Email author Wolfgang Grimme 2 Sven Maertens 2 1. Institute of Propulsion Technology German Aerospace Center (DLR) Cologne Germany 2. Institute of Air Transport and Airport Research German Aerospace Center (DLR) Cologne Germany.

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